It is a common complaint levied against atheists that they hold a subjective morality; it is a common atheist retort is it not so. The problem of semantics looms large in such a discussion, the atheists mean one thing by `objective morality' while the theists mean something entirely else, and hence both sides are basically correct in their assertions but they rarely come to understand one another. The atheist argues against the charge by noting that "Action X creates the most happiness for everyone" or "Action X creates the most happiness for me" are clearly objective truths given some measure of happiness. The theist objects that `happiness' is an inherently subjectve criterion for morality. The problem is thus revealed: the first is addressing the evaluation of moral prescriptions within a given moral theory, whereas the second is concerned instead with the reasons given in support of the theory itself and whether or not they are independant of our own minds.
Ethical Subjectivism vs. Substantiating Moral Theories
The atheist in the above example is speaking of the `subjectivity'
of ethics in the way that the term is commonly used in ethical philosophy.
A subjective ethic in this sense is a moral theory which views propositions
such as "You should not lie" as telling us something about the speaker
or humankind rather than the external world; this sort of ethical subjectivism
equates "Lying is wrong" with a statement of one's emotions "I don't like
lying." Various nontheistic moral theories such as utilitarianism
or egoism view moral propositions as telling us something about the world
itself, such as "Lying creates unhappiness" and hence such moral theories
as thus considered by ethicists to be objective rather than subjective.
But this is not what the theist it driving at when (s)he levies the charge of subjectivity. Rather than addressing individual moral propositions such as "You should not lie" within the context of some given ethical theory, the proponent of exclusivly theistic moral objectivism wishes instead to address the justification for ethical theories themselves. To this end, a moral theory is considered `objective' if its underlying moral assumptions (such as "One ought to increase general happiness") are somehow true independently of the perceptions and desires of the moral agents involved. The theist is using the term `objective' not in the typical way it is used in ethical philosophy but rather in the more everyday sense of Webster's 1b, "having reality independent of the mind." This is the kind of objectivity addressed in this essay.
The question posed is how we know which moral theory is truly the correct one. The comparision is between naturalistic ethical theories such as "We ought to maximize happiness," "We ought to minimize suffering," "We ought to maximize personal pleasure," and the theistic maxim "We ought to please God." The claim of theistic moral exclusivists is that only the latter of these may be said to be true independently of our perceptions, whereas any others are based upon subjective preferences such as our feelings about pain, pleasure, contentment, happiness and other such related matters.
Objective Justifications of Theistic Normative Ethics
The arguments supporting this claim are grounded in the underlying
meaning and justification of the moral ought. When we require justification
for an ethical theory by asking "Why should we follow theory X?" the answer
may be either in terms of human desires "it will make you/everyone happier"
or else in the form of an appeal to the nature of the universe itself.
The former justification is subjective whereas the latter is objective
(in Kantian terminology one would say that the former is a hypothetical
imperative while the latter is a categorical imperative).
A given moral theory may be may be seen to be justified in one of three ways: it may be established by the command of an authority, it may be desireable unto some given end, or it may be the end for which a moral agent was created, that is, mandate, desirability, and intention. In the first case, morality is justified as fiat, the answer is "I was told to." In the second view the moral ought is seen as stemming from the desirability of certain moral actions or their consequences, hence the answer is "It is desireable." The third idea is teleological, following some ordained morality is viewed as the purpose of human existence, so the answer is "I was made to do so."
The proponent of objective theistic ethics would claim that humans mandates, desires, and intentions are insufficient to make a moral theory objective, since such are products of the human mind itself and hence cannot be a fact about the universe itself with a reality independent of the mind. The question "Why ought we follow divine commands?" is thus answered terms of attributes of God: "Because God said so," "Because God desires it," or "Because God created us for it."
Of course, it is not enough to demonstrate that the theist has some way of claiming an objective justification for their normative ethical theory, it must be shown that the atheist has no way of doing this. This is done by first specifying precisely how a moral theory may possibly considered correct, then demonstrating how this cannot be done without an appeal to a transcendent being. This is shown in the formalizations below.
Theistic Argument from Objective Fiat Ethics
Theistic Argument from Objective Ganaic Ethics
Theistic Argument from Objective Teleological Ethics
Objective Morality as Theistic Argument
Some apologists, such as C.S. Lewis, have attempted to use the above
arguments to demonstrate the existence of God. The problem in such
reasoning is that it attempts to convince the reader of the reality of
genuinely objective morality via an appeal to shared human moral intuitions.
As we have seen, howver, such intuitions are a far cry from the sort of
objectivity which the apologist seeks, and hence the skeptic is unconvinced
of the soundness of the crucial third premise in the arguments above.
Note: this section will be expanded upon in future additions to this essay.
Critiques of Objective Theistic Ethics
The atheist ethicist might well admit that the theist has grounds for
claiming that their divinely ordained theory of ethics is objectively grounded
in a way that his naturalistic morality cannot be, but while the apologist
might see this as a victory of sorts, the atheist response is merely dismissive,
"So what if your ethics are theoretically objective? How does that make
them better?"
The former query underscores the fact that the atheist sees the basic theistic premise as flawed, and hence views theistic ethics grounded upon divine command as a mere fiction, a figment of theistic imagination. The atheist does not allow the premise that any moral code was indeed ordained and revealed by a god, indeed the theist typically disallows this for every moral code but his/her own. To put this question aside for the moment, suppose that one allows both divinely ordained and rationalistic ethical theories as possibilities, the latter question remains, how is it that objectively grounded ethics are to be considered better than those grounded instead in human needs and desires?
In answer to this apologists claim the superiority divine ethics over secular ethics is that they allow for a stronger sense of accountability. This seems a valid point, whether theism is true or not it is desirable that people are motivated to act morally, and a sense of accountability to an all-seeing being would certainly encourage this. Some atheistic ethicists counter with the claim that other forms of motivation such as self-interest and the desire for happiness are more effective motivators toward morality, also they typically view morality and accountability itself somewhat differently than their theistic counterparts. On the point of accountability it may suffice to say that different worldview and indeed ethical theories concieve it in a way commensurate with their own ethical views and less compatible with others.
Another contention is that theists have an absolute moral standard to appeal to, while atheists must deal with complex ethical theorizing, situational ethics, and the conflicting desires and need of various people. The atheistic counter is that the theists must deal with precisely the same problems in their attempts to determine, interpret and apply their divine precepts to everyday ethical conundrums. The determination of which divinely ordained theory is the correct one is at least as formidable as the task of determining which secular ethical theory, as evidenced by the wide variety of theistic codes of ethics available contrasted with a relative paucity of secular moral theories. Likewise, the interpretation and application of theistic moral codes are rather difficult, since they are not so much theories consisting of general principles as they are collections of injunctions and prohibitions. While a moral principle such as "Love thy neighbor as thyself." is as relatively easy to apply, it is actually a secular moral principle which happens to be bundled in with many various theistic moral codes. It is not the principle which hinders application, but the various injunctions and prohibitions attached to it, particularly those which do not seem to follow from the principle itself.
This raises an interesting point -- most theistic moral codes share a common core of moral precepts which each other and with many of the rational moral theories. This is because theistic moral codes were developed by peoples who needed a practical morality which addressed real human behavior and the consequences thereof. The problem is that each theistic moral code is tailored to the culture in which it was formed, designed to suit the institutions thereof and infused with the community mythologies. Rationalistic moral theories based upon human needs which apply these common generalized moral principles to our current human condition are more likely to produce results which do a good job of addressing said needs in their present context than religious rules based upon the mores of ancient cultures.
Conclusion
Atheistic moral theories are in some sense inherently subjective in
that they appeal to our desires and perceptions for their ultimate justification,
but whether this is truly a problem for atheism is another issue altogether.
There is no compelling reason why an athiest would view such objective
morality as desirable, indeed, the naturalistic ethicist would counter
that the subjectivity of secular moral theories gives them several advantages
over allegedly divinely ordained theories: they are not dependent upon
any given metaphysical framework or specific claims of moral revelation,
they are easier to agree upon and apply, and they are inherently in accordance
with our nature in that they are designed to yield practical results.
Of course, if theism is indeed true then all of these advantages may be
of little consequence in the long run. It seems the advocates of
divine command theory and those who argue against them in favor of secular
moral theories are effectively at an impasse, they must return to the more
basic question of the existence
of God.